Das Paper "On The Effect of Replacement Policies on The Security of Randomized Cache Architectures" von Moritz Peters, Nicolas Gaudin, Jan Philipp Thoma, Vianney Lapotre, Pascal Cotret, Guy Gogniat, Tim Güneysu wurde für die ASIA CCS'24 akzeptiert.
Abstract
Randomizing the mapping of addresses to cache entries has proven to be an effective technique for hardening caches against contention-based attacks like Prime+Probe. While attacks and defenses are still evolving, it is clear that randomized caches significantly increase the security against such attacks. However, one aspect that is missing from most analyses of randomized cache architectures is the choice of the replacement policy. Often, only the random- and LRU replacement policies are investigated. However, LRU is not applicable to randomized caches due to its immense hardware overhead, while the random replacement policy is not ideal from a performance and security perspective.
In this paper, we explore replacement policies for randomized caches. We develop two new replacement policies and evaluate a total of five replacement policies regarding their security against Prime+Prune+Probe attackers. Moreover, we analyze the effect of the replacement policy on the system's performance and quantify the introduced hardware overhead. We implement randomized caches with configurable replacement policies in software and hardware using a custom cache simulator, gem5, and the CV32E40P RISC-V core. Among others, we show that the construction of eviction sets with our new policy, VARP-64, requires over 25-times more cache accesses than with the random replacement policy while also enhancing overall performance.